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GOING FOR THE JUGULAR VEIN: ARRESTS
AND A1TACHMENTS IN ADMIRALTY
ROBERT G. McCREARY, JR.*
The author discusses the legal and practical aspects of admiralty
seizures in rem and attachments incident to action in personam.
Presented in detail are the requirements for issuance of process,
types of property which can be the subject of arrest or attachment,
and methods of seizure. Also analyzed are the important methods
available to a defendant to obtain release of seized property and
his defenses and countermeasures to arrest and attachment.
Scene: The chart room of an admiralty law office high above
Cleveland Harbor on a late Saturday afternoon. Seated on a stool, the
senior proctor reads from a sheaf of documents and makes measure-
ments on the chart with dividers. For a brief moment he smiles with
wicked satisfaction and then, turning to a junior proctor, he hands
him the documents and speaks rapidly: "File them. Seize the felon.
Sails at midnight. Pier 26. Clerk ready. Monition to the marshal. No
court order necessary. Utmost secrecy-muffled oars. Plaster him good
and stay there. No bond possible 'til Monday. Aha, Aha, some quiet
London gardens will reverberate this weekend. You understand me
perfectly? Manucaption at midnight. Delightful, Delightful."
In another setting this scene and the midnight arrest it fore-
shadows would, if the "felon" were a natural person, "shock the con-
science" of the court and "offend the community's sense of fair play
and decency" because of the "ignoble short cut" of legal process and
"the stealthy encroachment" on the constitutional rights of the citizen.'
However, we are not here concerned with the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures or with seizures
or arrests under criminal law, but with the civil remedies of arrest and
attachment under admiralty law.
In the setting of admiralty law, the "felon" which we have pic-
tured is, of course, not a natural person, but a ship personified as a
wrongdoer.2 The scene portrays nothing more than a thoroughly pro-
fessional and ethical pursuit of one of the two most drastic remedies
known to modern civil law; that is, arrest of property by an admiralty
proceeding in rem. The other drastic remedy is attachment of property
by an admiralty proceeding in personam.
* Member of the Ohio Bar and Instructor in Admiralty Law, Bachus School of Law,
Western Reserve University.
I Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 See Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 224 (1945).
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These remedies are drastic because: (1) no court order is neces-
sary for issuance of process; (2) no personal service on the defendant
is required; (3) no bond to answer for a wrongful seizure is required
of the plaintiff; (4) before adjudication of liability or damages, a bond
for twice the amount of the claim may be required from the defendant
for release of the property; and (5) before adjudication of liability
the property, if not released by bond, may be sold under certain con-
ditions.
Despite these and other strictures peculiar to each remedy, the
courts have generally commended these procedures as being supported
by long established custom and public policy and have interpreted the
remedies with great liberality.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE REMEDIES
The action in rem3 is brought by arrest of maritime property in
which plaintiff has acquired a lien under maritime law,4 or when a lien
is created by statute.5 The property is the named defendant, and dam-
ages cannot exceed the value of the property. Seizure in rem is allowed
even if suit against the person could be brought in the district; the rule
provides that a party "who may proceed in rem may also, or in the
alternative, proceed in personam against any person who may be li-
able." 6
The action in personam, with prayer for attachment,7 is brought
by assertion of a maritime claim and by attachment of defendant's
property following an affidavit by plaintiff that defendant cannot be
found in the district. In this case a person is the named defendant, but
damages cannot exceed the value of the property attached. Attachment
is not permitted when by a good faith effort defendant may be "found"
S See Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. C.
4 The common law of the sea as distinguished from statutory law. See Romero
v. Intl Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See infra note 44.
5 Ship Mortgage Act, 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84; Federal Maritime
Lien Act, 41 Stat. 1006 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-975; Death on the High Seas Act, 41
Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761; Vessel of Panama Canal Co., 41 Stat. 525 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 741; Forfeiture Statutes, 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 113 (6th ed. 1940),
citing 28 U.S.C. § 41(a) (now 62 Stat. 934 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1355); § 115 citing
28 U.S.C. § 106 (now 62 Stat. 936 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1395). A state statute creating
a lien may be enforced in rem in federal court (and in Federal Court only) if (a) the
vessel is a "domestic" vessel, (b) the claim giving rise to the lien is a maritime claim,
and (c) maritime law or a federal statute does not create such a lien. State statutes
creating non-maritime liens may be enforced in state courts against domestic or foreign
vessels. 1 Benedict, Admiralty (6th ed. 1940) §§ 87-88.
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm., Supp. C(1) (b).
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm., Supp. B.
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within the district.8 There is no requirement that plaintiff have a mari-
time lien on the property attached.
The action in rem is exclusively with the admiralty jurisdiction,
so it need not be identified in the pleadings as an admiralty or maritime
claim,9 although it is prudent to do so. However, the action in personam
with clause for attachment may present a situation of dual jurisdic-
tion;1 0 therefore, if plaintiff desires to invoke the admiralty juris-
diction, he must specifically do so in the pleadings.1 The chief charac-
teristic of the "admiralty side" of the court is that, with a narrow
exception,12 trial is by the court without a jury.
II. THE SuPRimm CouRT's ViEw
Approbation of these procedures by the Supreme Court is found
in the fact that they were, for over a hundred years, authorized by the
Supreme Court Rules although they were not specifically authorized
by any statute.3 They are now authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended by the Supreme Court, effective July 1,
1966, whereby the civil and admiralty procedures were unified and the
former Admiralty Rules of the Supreme Court were rescinded.
In regard to the remedy of attachment, the Court long ago con-
firmed its authority to promulgate former Admiralty Rule 2 which
allowed the acquiring of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident de-
fendant by attachment of his property within the district. The Court
held that Rule 2 did not violate a prohibition in the Judiciary Act of
178914 against the bringing of a civil action against an inhabitant of
8 See discussion if "found," infra.
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 (h).
10 The maritime remedy of attachment permitted by supplemental rule B can only
be pursued within the admiralty jurisdiction. "In addition, or in the alternative," how-
ever, rule B permits plaintiff to invoke attachment remedies under state law. By virtue
of the so-called "saving clause," 28 U.S.C. § 1333, 63 Stat. 101 (1949), a maritime claim
(as distinguished from a maritime remedy) may be brought on the "law" side of the
court, when independent grounds for "law" jurisdiction exist. Thus a claim which in-
vokes a state created attachment remedy, which shows diversity of citizenship and the
jurisdictional amount, but which by nature is a maritime claim, presents a situation of
dual jurisdiction. Cf. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915).
11 Supra note 9.
12 Great Lakes Jury Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1873, 62 Stat. 953 (1948).
13 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 297 (1870). Ultimate authority for these
procedures rests either upon the Supreme Court's rule making power, Kingston Dry
Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2 Cir. 1929) or upon the con-
stitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction as implemented by statute, Manro v. Almeida,
23 U.S. 473 (1825); Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia
Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1963).
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the United States in a district other than where he resides.15 Sixteen
years later the Court again upheld the procedure of foreign attachment,
saying:
To compel suitors in admiralty (when the ship is abroad and cannot
be reached by a libel in rem) to resort to the home of the defendant,
and to prevent them from suing him in any district in which... his
goods or credits [might be] attached, would not only often put them
to great delay, inconvenience and expense, but would in many cases
amount to a denial of justice.16
The high favor in which the remedy of foreign attachment is held
is further shown by the Court's action in 1950 in Swift & Co. Packers
v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A.1 7 There a vessel, alleged to
be owned by the same company that owned a vessel on which plain-
tiff's cargo had been lost, was seized in the Canal Zone under process
of attachment. Just prior to the filing of suit, title to the vessel had
been transferred to another corporation recently organized by the
vessel owner. The district court dissolved the attachment on the ground
that defendant had no title in the property and that an admiralty court
had no jurisdiction to inquire into the circumstances of the transfer.
The Supreme Court, without dissent, reversed and remanded on the
grounds that admiralty may grant equitable relief upon issues collateral
to a maritime cause of action, that admiralty may protect its juris-
diction from being thwarted by a fraudulent transfer of property, and
that "the importance of the right to proceed by attachment to afford
security has been emphasized.""' The Court, speaking through Justice
Frankfurter, said:
The process of foreign attachment is known of old in admiralty.
It has two purposes: to secure a respondent's appearance and to
assure satisfaction in case the suit is successful .... P
On the other hand, there have been few policy pronouncements by
the Supreme Court in regard to the remedy of arrest of property in an
in rem proceeding. Perhaps this is because the right to an in rem
remedy and the right under substantive maritime law to a maritime
lien are so interdependent2 ° that the remedy, as well as the substantive
15 Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. 272 (1873).
16 In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 493 (1889).
17 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
18 Id. at 698.
'9 Id. at 693.
20 "The lien and the proceeding in rem are, therefore, correlative-where one exdsts,
the other can be taken, and not otherwise." The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. 213, 215
(1867); 1 Benedict, supra note 5, §§ 11-12.
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right to a lien, is included within the constitutional grant of admiralty
jurisdiction.
Twice in recent years the Court has discussed the in rem remedy.
In Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States2 the Court, through Justice
Reed, spoke approvingly of this remedy:
The use of the phrase "caused by a public vessel" constitutes an
adoption by Congress of the customary legal terminology of the
admiralty law which refers to the vessel as causing the harm
although the actual cause is the negligence of the personnel in the
operation of the ship. Such personification of the vessel, treating
it as a juristic person whose acts and omissions, although brought
about by her personnel, are personal acts of the ship for which, as a
juristic person, she is legally responsible, has long been recognized
by this Court ... 22
Fifteen years later, in Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,
23
the Court considered the in rem remedy in a different context. The
change of venue statute allows, for purposes of convenience, the trans-
fer of "any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought."2 4 A ship had been seized in an action in rem and
her owner had been sued in personam in the Eastern District of Lou-
isiana. Motion of the shipowner was granted to transfer venue to the
Western District of Tennessee where the owner was subject to service,
but where the vessel could not have been arrested. The Supreme Court
affirmed the transfer on the ground that for the purpose of the change
of venue statute, only a single civil action had been brought (the in
personam action) which was transferable to a district where the ship-
owner could be served with process, and that the in rem action against
the ship should be disregarded in the "dry-land context of forum non
conveniens ' 25 as being a useless fiction. The Court referred to the
"longstanding admiralty fiction that a vessel may be assumed to be
a person for the purpose of filing a lawsuit and enforcing a judgment, '26
and referred to critics who called the fiction "an animistic survival from
remote times," "irrational" and "archaic.
'27
Yet, it is clear that the Court in FBL-585 did not mean to go be-
21 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
22 Id. at 224.
23 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 76A Stat. 699 (1962).
25 Supra note 23, at 23. justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred for other
reasons. justices Whitaker and Douglas dissented.
26 Id. at 22-23.
27 Id. at 23, citing The Carlotta, 48 F.2d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1931), quoted in Gilmore
and Black, The Law of Admiralty 508 (1957).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
yond the narrow issue before it because, speaking through Justice
Black, it cautioned critics of the fiction:
Perhaps this is going too far since the fiction is one that certainly had
real cause for its existence in its context and in the day and genera-
tion in which it was created. A purpose of the fiction, among others,
has been to allow actions against ships where a person owning the
ship could not be reached, and it can be very useful for this purpose
still.28
It should be noted that even within the scope of the FBL-585 case,
the Court did not attack the maritime lien as such which is the basis of
the in rem remedy. The existence of "that most cherished and char-
acteristic badge-the formidable lien in rein' 29 remains an unchallenged
doctrine3 Instead, the court attacked one aspect of the maritime lien,
the personification of the ship as actor, which is only one of several
explanations of the lien which have competed for rational acceptance.3
A. Requirements for Issuance of Process
The former practice required that a libel (complaint) "shall be on
oath or solemn affirmation. 32 Since the merger of the Admiralty and
Civil Rules, the same requirement exists in regard to a complaint con-
taining a prayer for attachment,3 or in regard to a complaint in rein.34
In addition, if the complaint contains a prayer for attachment, plain-
tiff, or his attorney, must give an affidavit that to affiant's knowledge
the defendant cannot be found in the district 35
In some jurisdictions the former practice also required an order
from the court before process in rem or for attachment would issue3
In the busier admiralty districts, the clerk was empowered to issue
process without order of the court,3 7 and under the Supplemental
Rules the clerk is now so authorized. 8
There has never been any requirement that the plaintiff seeking to
arrest or to attach property in admiralty post bond as security for
28 Ibid.
29 Flowers v. Travelers Insurance Co., 258 F.2d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 1958).
80 Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon S.S. Corp., 290 U.S. 117, 121, 125 (1933).
81 Compare 1 Benedict, supra note 5, § 11 (personification of the ship) with § 13
(ship as an instrument of credit); Gilmore & Black, supra note 27, 483-510 (1957).
82 United States v. 935 Cases More or Less, 136 F.2d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 1943).
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm. Supp. B(1).
84 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm. Supp. C(2).
35 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm. Supp. B(1).
36 Manro v. Abneida, supra note 13, at 492 (1825)--attachment; The Berkeley,
58 F. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1893)-Arrest.
87 2 Benedict, supra note 5, at 348.
38 Supra note 3, B(1)-Attachment; supra note 3, C(3)-Arrest.
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damages arising from a wrongful seizure,3 9 but local district court rules
usually require that plaintiff give security for court costs at the time
of filing the complaint. Supplemental Rule E(2) (b) gives the court
discretion to require any party at any time to give security "for costs
and expenses."
Although the general rule in admiralty is that a party is not en-
titled to recover damages for arrest or attachment of his property
merely because the suit has failed on the merits,40 bad faith or gross
negligence by plaintiff in arresting or attaching property will not only
result in release of the property, but will subject plaintiff to liability
for damages.4' Furthermore, even though failure of the suit on the
merits will not in itself support a claim for damages for wrongful
seizure, the unsuccessful plaintiff will be charged with court costs,
which can be sizeable if plaintiff has insisted upon a bond for release of
the property' because the premiums on the bond are normally included
in the court costs.43 Plaintiff may also be required to advance a deposit
for the initial custodial expenses of the marshal.44
B. Subject Matter of Arrest or Attachment
Plaintiff in a suit in rem may cause to be arrested any property in
which he has a maritime lien.45 The subject of these liens, and therefore
29 Brown v. Pan Oceanica Shipping Corp., 182 F. Supp. 730 (D. Md. 1960). In
state court practice in a replevin action or attachment proceedings, plaintiff must usually
file bond equal to twice the value of the property seized. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2715.04 (Page 1954).
40 2 Benedict, supra note 5 § 304.
41 See Damages for Wrongful Arrest or Attachment, infra.
42 Current annual premiums for release bond or stipulation for value are in the
range of $750 to $10.00 per $1,000.00 of idemnity up to $100,000.00, and then at a lesser
rate.
43 But premiums for a release bond will not be charged as costs where instead
of furnishing a cost free Letter of Undertaking which would have been agreeable to
plaintiff, the claimant posts a release bond. Greenwich Marine, Inc. v. S.S. Alexandra, 339
F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1965).
44 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm. Supp. E(4) (e); 28 U.S.C. § 1921, 76 Stat. 417 (1962).
45 Maritime liens spring into existence as a result of maritime tort, breach of mari-
time contract, acts of salvage and general average, etc. 1 Benedict, supra note 5, at 19. The
only common tort situation involving ships which does not give rise to a lien is injury
to or death of a seaman caused by his employer's negligence. Then the only remedy
is under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), which does not support a
lien. Plamals v. S.S. Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928). Cf. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964). The only common contract situation involving ships which
does not give rise to a lien for a breach is a shipbuilding contract which is not regarded
as a maritime contract. 1 Benedict, supra note 5, §§ 61-71, §§ 92-98. Speaking generally,
a maritime lien does not depend on possession nor on recording, and cannot be divested
except by the giving of other security, by judicial sale, or by laches in enforcement.
Gilmore and Black, supra note 27, at 624.
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of seizure, are the privately owned ship,46 the cargo carried on the ship,
and freight monies earned by the ship. Rarely, however, could a single
claim support a lien in all of these interests.
The ship, of course, is the most common subject of lien and of
seizure, but cargo has often been regarded as itself the contracting
thing47 much in the same way as a vessel is so regarded.48 The ship-
owner may cause cargo to be arrested for non-payment of freight, for
demurrage, or for general average.49 However, it should be noted
that while these transactions create a maritime lien in cargo, the lien,
unlike the usual maritime lien, is lost by an unconditional delivery to
the consignee.5" Possibly even a dog that bites an admiralty lawyer
may be sued in rem. 51
The concept of the "offending thing" as supporting a lien against
the ship or cargo cannot be applied to real property; thus a bridge
which falls on a ship cannot be sued.2 Appurtenances to a vessel,
such as radiotelephone, radio direction finder and fathometer, which
are removed before the filing of the complaint against the vessel, are
also subject to the seizure, and the court may order their return to the
vessel.
53
The subjects of attachment are broader than the subject of arrest
by process in rem. Supplemental Rule B provides for attachment of
"the defendant's goods and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands
of garnishees."54 There is no requirement that plaintiff have a maritime
lien in the property; 55 but, on the other hand, plaintiff's possession of a
maritime lien does not prevent attachment.5" A vessel owned by de-
46 Publicly owned vessels are immune from seizure, at least if owned by friendly
powers. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, SA., v. The Navemar, 303 U.S.
68 (1938).
47 And, no doubt, the "offending thing."
48 Sprague and Healy, Cases on Admiralty 228, n.24 (1950) ; Healy and Currie, Cases
and Materials on Admiralty 149 (1965).
49 Healy and Currie, supra note 48.
50 4885 Bags of Linseed, 66 U.S. 108 (1861).
51 In The Lord Derby, 17 Fed. 265 (E.D. La. 1883), the pilot was bitten by a dog
kept in the master's cabin. He brought suit in rem against the vessel. The court presented,
but did not discuss, an alternative basis for recovery; namely, a suit in rem against the
dog, for, said the court, "It [the dog], was part of the cargo." 17 Fed. at 266.
52 The Rock Island Bridge, supra note 20, at 216. Cf. The Arkansas, 17 F. 383, 386
(S.D. Iowa 1883).
53 Nelson v. Oil Screw Arctic, 1956 A.M.C. 502 (WD. Wash. 1956); but cf. San
Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Oil Screw Linda Lee, 1949 A.M.C. 324 (S.D. Calif. 1947).
54 Supra note 7, B(1).
55 Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303, 307 (1915).
56 In Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1941), plaintiff arrested
the ship on a maintenance and cure cause of action brought in rem and attached the ship
on a Jones Act cause of action brought in personam. Both seizures were upheld over de-
[Vol. 28
1967] ADMIRALTY ARRESTS AND ATTACHMENTS 27
fendant may, of course, be attached,57 as may a vessel being purchased
by defendant under a conditional sales contract.58 However, a vessel in
defendant's possession as a demise or bare boat charterer may not be
attached because title is unconditionally in the owner.59
Intangible property of the defendant in the hands of third parties,
such as bank accounts, insurance proceeds,6" and sub-freights,61 may
be attached, although credits in the hands of the United States have
been held immune from garnishment.62
As is true of the action in rem, there can be no attachment of real
property owned by defendant because real property does not fall within
the definition of "goods and chattels or credits and effects."63
C. Time, Place, Method, and Notice of Seizure
A complaint in rem must describe the property to be seized and
must state "that it is within the district or will be during the pendency
of the action." 4 There is, therefore, no requirement that the property
be within the district at the time of filing of the complaint.65 Process
fendant's objection that there could be no arrest of a vessel in rem for a Jones Act claim
because, as the court held, the attachment of the vessel was not an in rem proceeding.
57 In Lewis v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 163 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1958), it was
held that admiralty had jurisdiction of a longshoreman's in personam suit where he was
injured on the Ocean Deborah and attached another vessel of the same owner, the Ocean
Evelyn. But attachment of a vessel does not cover rented equipment not owned by de-
fendant or necessary for the vessel's operation. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Charleston Lighterage
& Transfer Co., 95 F. Supp. 249 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
58 Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.
1929).
rig McGahem v. Koppers Coal Co., 108 F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1940). Nor can the char-
terer's contract rights in the vessel be attached. Applewhaite v. S.S. Sunprincess, 136 F.
Supp. 769 (NJ. 1956).
60 Cf. Federazione Italiana, D.C.A. v. Mandask Compania D.V., 158 F. Supp. 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), where attachment of hull insurance proceeds failed because defendant
could be "found" in the district. See Procter & Gamble v. Tank Barge Fred E. Haslea,
1934 A.M.C. 1481 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) regarding attachment of liability insurance policies.
61 Bienvenido Shipping Co. v. Subfreights of S.S. Andora, 168 F. Supp. 127
(E.D.N.Y. 1958).
62 Chilean Line, Inc. v. United States, 344 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1965); The Beaton
Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946).
63 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870); Harriman v. Rockaway
Beach Co., S Fed. 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1880).
64 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm. Supp. C(2).
65 Pacific Coast S.S. Co. v. Bancroft Whitney Co., 94 Fed. 180 (9th Cir. 1899),
rev'd. on other grounds sub nom. Queen of the Pacific, 180 U.S. 49. Filing of the complaint
in rem is a commencement of the action within the one year period of limitation pre-
scribed by Carriage of Goods by Sea Act although process not issued until after statutory
period. Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1955); United
Nations v. SS. Mormacmail, 99 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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in rem may be held in abeyance if plaintiff so requests.6 This is often
done when the shipowner has agreed to give security in lieu of arrest
of his vessel. 7 Where plaintiff has filed suit both in personam and in
rem, but has not seized the vessel, he may later seize it, even while an
appeal is pending, if circumstances change and thus perfect the in rem
action.68
Process for attachment may also be held in. abeyance.69 As a
practical matter, though, if the location of property of defendant is
known, attachment should not be delayed because, as will be further
discussed,70 an entry of personal appearance by defendant before
attachment will defeat attachment altogether.
Regarding place of seizure, Supplemental Rule E provides that
process either in rem or by attachment "shall be served only within the
district." In general, the maritime boundaries of a district are deter-
mined by the maritime boundaries of the state in which the district is
located.71 For example, the far shore of a river,72 the thread of a river,73
the middle of a lake,74 the international boundary line, 75 and a marine
league (3 statute miles) from shore76 may mark the maritime bound-
aries of a district.
It is proper for the marshal to seize a vessel which is passing
through the waters of the district and which does not intend to stop
within the district.77 In Witham v. The James E. McAlpine,78 a vessel
66 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm. Supp. E(3) (b).
67 Anglo American Grain Co. Ltd. v. SIT Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 909 (El. Va.
1959).
68 Grauwiller Transp. Co. v. Exner Sand & Gravel Corp., 162 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1947).
But beware of laches. By the same token release of a vessel without bond pending an
appeal vacates that in rem appeal, there being no res. The Manuel Arnus, 141 F.2d 589(5th Cir. 1944).
69 Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm. Supp. E(3) (b).
70 See Defenses and Countermeasures, infra.
71 Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U.S. 401 (1883). For an exception see note 83, infra.
72 Boundary of Kentucky is north shore of Ohio River. Walker v. Fehnont Oil Corp.,
240 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1957).
73 Thread of Mississippi River is boundary between Mississippi and Louisiana. Ander-
son Tully Co. v. Tingle, 166 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1948).
74 Middle of Lake Michigan is boundary between Michigan and Wisconsin. Michigan
v. Wisconsin, 272 U.S. 398 (1926).
75 Northern boundary of Ohio is International Boundary Line running through Lake
Erie. Edson v. Crangle, 62 Ohio St. 49, 56 N.E. 647 (1900).
76 State of Alabama; First National Bank in Greenwich v. National Air Lines, Inc.,
288 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1961).
77 The so-called "right of innocent passage" does not prevent arrest of a vessel. See
Republic of Panama v. United States, 1933 A.M.C. 1662 (General Claims Commission
U.S. and Panama 1933).
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downbound in the St. Clair River (which divides the United States and
Canada) was arrested by in rem process abreast of St. Clair, Michigan
in American waters. The master was ordered by the marshal to
proceed to Detroit, a four hour run, and to dock at a designated place.
However, security arrangements were made over radiotelephone for
release of the vessel, and she was permitted to proceed. Her owner
then moved for dissolution of the seizure on the ground that valid
admiralty process contemplated the capability of the marshal to take
full custody of the property seized which in this case he could not do
because he was not a navigator. The court held that the arrest was
valid because it took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
district and that if the master had refused to comply with the marshal's
orders, the marshal could have called upon the United States Coast
Guard to execute his orders.79 The filing of a stipulation for release of
a vessel which has been seized cannot confer jurisdiction,80 nor can
jurisdiction be stipulated if the vessel is at no time within the juris-
diction during the pendency of process.'
In the attachment cases, the question arises as to the proper place
to attach the defendant's bank account. In the adjoining Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York, it was for a time permissible for a
plaintiff who could have obtained personal service on the defendant in
the Southern District to file suit in personam in the Eastern District
where defendant could not be "found," and then to attach defendant's
bank account deposited in a Manhattan (Southern District) bank by
notice of garnishment served upon a branch of the Manhattan bank
located in the Eastern District. Choosing the forum which makes
attachment possible is not considered an abuse of process,82 and has
been countenanced on the ground that service on the garnishee within
the district was proper regardless of the situs of the debt.83 However,
in Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp.,84 it was
78 96 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Mich. 1951).
79 In Tampa Tugs & Towing, Inc. v. M/V Sandager, 242 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Calif.
1965), service of process in rem upon tugs engaged in towing a burning vessel was upheld.
80 In The Hungaria, 41 F.2d 109 (D.S.C. 1889), seizure by the marshal of a vessel
as she lay at anchor 432 miles from shore was invalidated because the vessel was outside
the territorial limit of South Carolina, the limit being the high water mark of the Atlantic
Ocean.
81 Puget Sound Stevedore Co. v. United States, 287 Fed. 751 (W.D. Wash. 1923).
82 Shamrock Towing Co. v. Mfrs. & Merchants Lighterage Co., 262 Fed. 844
(E.D.N.Y. 1918); Cavanaugh v. Starbuck Towing Corp., 261 Fed. 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1919).
83 Konstantinidis v. The S.S. Tarsus, 196 F. Supp. 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); cf. Miravalles
Compania Naviera v. The Nissho Co. Ltd., 207 F. Supp. 716, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Patel
Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Steel Traveler, 108 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
84 341 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1965).
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held that under New York law the situs of a debt owed by a branch
bank was the location of the branch bank and because defendant's ac-
count was in a Manhattan bank (Southern District), it could not be
attached within the Eastern District. 5
The physical means of seizure by the marshal of both tangible and
intangible property is described in more detail under the new rules"8
than under the old rules. If it is practicable for the marshal to take
actual possession of tangible property, he must do so; if actual posses-
sion is impracticable, the marshal must affix a copy of the process to
the property in a conspicuous place87 and leave a copy of the complaint
and process with the person in charge. If intangible property is in-
volved, the marshal must leave a copy of the complaint and process
with the garnishee or obligor.
Under the new practice, notice requirements in an in rem proceed-
ing have been liberalized. The former rules require the marshal after
arrest of the property to give public notice thereof by newspaper, but
as the Advisory Committee on the new rules noted,88 this was expen-
sive and unnecessary when the owner entered his appearance promptly
after seizure and arranged for release of his property. 9 Supplemental
Rule C(4) provides for notice only in the event that the property
is not released within ten days after execution of process.
Under the former rules, no notice was required in an attachment
proceeding. But under Supplemental Rule B(2) no judgment by de-
85 A variation arose in Ships & Freights, Inc. v. Farr Whitlock, 188 F. Supp. 438
(E.D.N.Y. 1960). The court there recognized that because jurisdiction of the Eastern
District of New York defined in 28 U.S.C. § 112(c) includes "concurrently with the
Southern District, the waters within the counties of Bronx and New York," it is possible
to file a complaint in personam in the Eastern District against a shipowner who can be
found in the Southern District but not in the Eastern District and then obtain an attach-
ment of a vessel berthed within the Southern District. See Merritt-Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. Marine Transit Corp., 1930 A.M.C. 1294- (E.D.T.Y. 1930). But the court
in Ships and Freights, Inc., supra held that a plaintiff cannot by these means attach bank
funds in Manhattan since the funds are neither within the Eastern District nor in the
"waters" of Bronx or New York counties.
86 Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. E(4) (b) and (c).
87 In Yokahama Specie Bank v. Chengting T. Wang, 113 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1940),
a possessory action was filed against scrap iron aboard a Republic of China vessel. The
marshal handed a copy of the libel to the senior officer present, attached copy thereof
to a bulkhead in the saloon and had an interpreter read the process to the Chinese crew.
The seizure was held invalid because process was not attached to the cargo and because
no one took charge of the cargo.
88 See 39 F.R.D. 153.
89 Cf. San Rafael Compania Naviera, SA. v. American Smelting & R. Co., 327 F.2d
581 (9th Cir. 1964). Costs of publication of notice came to $12,000.00.
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fault may be entered except upon proof of notice, or attempted notice,
to defendant.
D. Release of Property
Nothing short of news of a major marine disaster is likely to
shock and dismay the shipowner more than news that his ship has
been seized. The ship, as a profit-making machine, must be kept mov-
ing. When it is idle, expenses mount, future cargoes may be lost, and
charter party penalties may be imposed.
It is, therefore, imperative that the vessel be released without
delay. This is initially a matter of negotiation between the owner's
attorneys and attorneys for the plaintiff. When the vessel is one of a
fleet of United States flag vessels owned by a company of good financial
repute whose vessels regularly call at the port of seizure, or are confined
in their trade to a particular locality by the nature of their construc-
tion,"0 little is to be gained by a seizure of the vessel in the first place;
action in personam with service upon the owner should suffice. How-
ever, if such a vessel is seized, the parties should be able to agree to
her release upon minimum assurances-at most a letter from the
ownerys insurance broker showing adequate insurance in force.
Even if the particular seizure presents a situation where the means
of collectibility are not so obvious, it is nevertheless common practice
for the parties to agree to the release of the vessel upon the promise of
counsel for the owner that he will promptly cause to be delivered to
plaintiff or to the court a so-called Letter of Undertaking or Under-
taking to Abide Decree. Such an undertaking is set forth in the opinion
in Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,91 and may be issued by
the owner or by an authorized representative of the owner's under-
writers, either to avoid a threatened seizure or to obtain release from
seizure. Typically, the undertaking is an agreement that in considera-
tion of plaintiff's refraining from seizure (or, after a seizure, agreeing
to a release) of the vessel, the owner or his underwriters shall enter an
appearance, shall make claim acknowledging ownership of the vessel,
and shall, whether the vessel be lost or not, pay any final decree which
may be rendered against the vessel, reserving, however, all rights and
defenses.
The attractiveness of such an agreement to the shipowner is, of
course, that he avoids the expense of bond premiums which, including
00 E.g., the conventional Great Lakes bulk carrier.
91 364 U.S. 19, 29 (1960). See also 2 Benedict, Admiralty § 368 591 (6th ed. 1940)
(Form 255).
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renewals during the pendency of the case, may become sizeable. 2 The
agreement may be attractive to plaintiff because it avoids the risk that
plaintiff may have of ultimately paying the premiums on a release bond
as would ordinarily be the case if he insists on a bond and the suit
fails. 3 Also, experienced counsel may have come to know various un-
derwriting and mutual insurance associations and know that these asso-
ciations honor their commitments.
Nevertheless there are situations where the dramatis personae in a
seizure are strangers to each other and where the wrong decision re-
garding the terms of release will appear to be without remedy. In such
circumstances counsel should insist on the posting of bond by the
owner of the property. If the parties cannot agree upon the amount
of the bond, then under Supplemental Rule E(5) (a) the court will
fix the bond at an amount "sufficient to cover the amount of the plain-
tiff's claim fairly stated" with interest at 6 percent and costs; but the
bond will not exceed (1) twice the amount of plaintiff's claim, or (2)
the appraised value of the property, whichever amount is smaller.94
Upon filing of a surety bond or lesser stipulation or other security 5
approved by plaintiff or his attorney authorizing release of the property
and upon payment of court costs, the property in the custody of the
marshal will be released 6 subject, in the case of a vessel, to clearance
by the Collector of Customs.9
The giving of a bond does not waive objection to the Court's juris-
diction over the subject matter,98 or waive the objection, either in cases
in rem or of attachment, that the seizure was unlawful.9 Furthermore,
the giving of a bond and the later filing of responsive pleadings by the
92 See note 41, supra.
93 See note 42, supra.
94 See Advisory Committee's note, 39 F.R.D. 159. The rule modifies 28 U.S.C. § 2464
in the light of The Lotosland, 2 F. Supp. 42, 43 (ED.N.Y. 1933), where the court held
that strict interpretation of the statute "would make necessary, for instance, in a libel
involving a personal injury case, by setting forth damage in any ridiculous figure what-
soever, the filing of a stipulation or bond in double the amount, no matter how slight the
actual injury or damage might have been. Such, certainly, could not have been the inten-
tion of the framers of the section...." Cf. Konstantinidis v. Denizcilik Bankasi, 307 F.2d
584 (2d Cir. 1962).
95 6 U.S.C. § 15, authorizes in lieu of a surety bond the depositing of bonds or notes
of the United States having par value equal to amount of surety bond.
98 Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. E(5) (c).
97 Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. E(4) (b). Todd Shipyards Corp. v. City of Athens,
83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949).
98 The Iquitos, 286 F. 383 (W.D. Wash. 1921).
99 See notes 76 and 78, supra. However, filing of claim and answer accomplishes
such a waiver. The Rosalie M., 12 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1926).
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owner of the property does not confer personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in an in rem action.10 The bond or stipulation for value
stands in place of the property seized,' 0 ' and discharges the lien there-
on so that the property cannot be arrested again in the same proceed-
ing 102i . °
The owner of property seized is, of course, not required to give
bond,10 3 but if he does not, the property arrested or attached will re-
main in custody and under certain circumstances may be sold prior
to determination of liability.104
An exception to the rule that property will be released by the
giving of a sufficient bond exists in the case of actions in rem which are
in the nature of possessory, petitory, or partition actions; 05 that is,
actions brought to determine the right to possession, 10 6 to try titie, or
to liquidate part ownership. In Panaghia Kathariotisa,°7 where the
libel was in rem for possession of the vessel, the trial court ordered
release of the vessel upon filing of a bond. This action was reversed on
appeal because the order in effect denied, without hearing on the merits,
plaintiff's prayer for relief, which was for possession of the vessel. This
decision does not appear to have been fully met by Supplemental
Rule E(5) (d) which without qualification makes possible the release
of property in these special actions "by order of the court."
E. Defenses and Countermeasures
The owner or garnishee of property attached, or about to be at-
tached, by process in personam and the owner of property arrested by
process in rem have formidable defenses and measures of retaliation in
cases of both wrongful seizure and lawful seizure.
1. Avoidance of Attachment by Prior Personal Appearance
The prerequisite of the remedy of attachment of defendant's
property is, of course, that defendant "shall not be found within the
100 J. K. Welding Co. v. Gotham Marine Corp., 47 F.2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); contra,
Mosher v. Tate, 182 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1950).
101 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1827); The Steamer Webb, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 406, 418 (1871); United States v. Ames, 99 U.S. 35 (1878); Morrissey v. SS A&J
Faith, 238 F. Supp. 877 (NJ). Ohio 1964).
102 In re National Motorship Corporation, 96 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1938); Pacific
Vegetable Oil Corp. v. S.S. Shalom, 249 F. Supp. 503 (S.DN.Y. 1966).
103 Supra note 98.
104 Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. E(9) (b).
105 See Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. D.
106 See as to ousting of sit-down strikers, Korthinos v. Niarchos, 175 F.2d 730 (4th
Cir. 1949).
107 165 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1948).
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district,' 0 8 so if an alert (or clairvoyant) defendant suspects that he
is about to be sued in a district where he has assets but no presence, he
can defeat attachment by promptly having his attorney make an entry
of appearance. 0 9 In The Valmar 0 the defendant's attorney, antid-
pating an attachment of defendant's vessel, advised the marshal's office
before the filing of suit where defendant, a non-resident, would be
available for service within the district and thus defeated attachment.
2. Dissolution of Attachment on Ground
That Defendant Can Be "Found" Within the District
The principal burden of establishing that defendant cannot be
found within the district is upon plaintiff."' Although the former
rules did not require from plaintiff a special affidavit on the subject
of his knowledge of defendant's whereabouts, plaintiff could not
properly withhold knowledge thereof from the marshal and thereby
leave the problem of service entirely to the diligence of the marshal.
In Federazione Italiana D.C.A. v. Mandask Compania D.V.,1 2 the
complaint was in personam for cargo loss, with prayer for attachment
on the proceeds of hull insurance payable to defendant as owner of the
vessel involved. The marshal made no inquiries regarding the presence
of defendant within the district, and attached credits of over
1,000,000 dollars in a Manhattan bank. Despite the fact that defendant
was not listed in telephone or building directories and did not display
its name on its office door, plaintiff's attorney knew that the president
of defendant had an office in the district from which most of defen-
dant's business was conducted, and yet he did not so inform the
marshal. Defendant's motion to vacate the attachment was granted on
the ground that plaintiff had made no bona fide effort to locate defen-
dant in the district.
Even though the present rules put the burden of disclosure upon
plaintiff, this does not mean that the marshal is entitled to auto-
matically attach defendant's goods. Supplemental Rule E(4) (a) pro-
vides that after issuance of process for attachment the marshal shall,
"when it appears that the defendant cannot be found within the
district" execute the process. Thus, it seems that the marshal would
be required to make the inquiries which are normal for personal service
108 Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. B(1).
109 2 Benedict, Admiralty § 290 (6th ed. 1940).
110 38 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc. v.
Zeeland Transp., Ltd., 154 F. Supp. 252 (D. Md. 1960); Cocotos Steamship of Panama v.
Sociedad Maritime Victoria, 146 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
111 Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. B(1).
112 158 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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in any case. If from such inquiries it appears that defendant cannot be
found, he may attach. The marshal is not required to make an unusual
effort or to conduct a "fine-toothed comb" search for defendant.
1 3
Thus, the validity of the attachment should not turn upon the actual
facts as they may be disclosed by defendant after attachment, but
instead upon plaintiff's knowledge and the marshal's knowledge, after
reasonable inquiry, prior to attachment." 4
The real problem is that proper service upon the defendant is
becoming easier. In United States v. Cia. Naviera Continental S.A.," 5
defendant moved to vacate attachment of one of its vessels which
was seized under a complaint in personam for breach of charter party.
Referring to the former pertinent admiralty rule, the court stated:"'
The rule does not define "found." The term has a different signifi-
cance depending whether the respondent is a resident or a non-
resident. In the case of a foreign respondent, such as we deal with
here, whether or not it can be found within the district presents a
two-pronged inquiry: First, whether it can be found within the
district in terms of jurisdiction, and, second, if so, whether it can
be found for service of process.
The court held that the first test depended upon the extent of defen-
dant's activities within the district, while the second test depended
upon the presence of "an officer, a managing or general agent" or other
responsible representative of defendant within the district who could
be served. Since the evidence showed that plaintiff had made no in-
quiries at all regarding defendant's presence within the district, and
since defendant's affidavits showed the presence in the jurisdiction of
a managing agent of defendant who signed the subject charter parties
and who conducted substantial business for defendant in the district,
the court dissolved the attachment.
In Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp.,"7
the defendant had its principal office in the Southern District of New
York. Plaintiff sued in personam in the Eastern District of New York
and the marshal, without actually attempting personal service, attached
credits in a branch bank of Manufacturers Hanover Trust, located in
Brooklyn. Upon defendant's motion the attachment was vacated on
three grounds, two of them pertinent here: (1) defendant had a
terminal and claims agent located within the Eastern District and was,
therefore, subject to personal service; and (2) since the former ad-
113 Seawind Compania SA. v. Crescent Line, Inc., 320 F.2d 580, 583 (2d Cir. 1963).
114 Ibid.
115 178 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
116 Id. at 563.
117 341 F.2d $0 (2d Cir. 1965).
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miralty rules made no provision for the method of service, service could
be made under Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
permits service anywhere within the state; therefore defendant, who
could have been served in the Southern District of New York, could be
"found" within the Eastern District. On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed vacation of the attachment upon ground (1), but expressly
refrained from ruling upon ground (2).11
However, in Chilean Line Inc. v. United States,"9 the same court
of appeals approved ground (2) and, in fact, extended it. There com-
plaint was filed in the Southern District of New York against a ship
repair company that was a New York corporation, but which had no
office in the Southern District. The clerk refused to issue process for
attachment of credits in the hands of the United States alleged to be
owed to the ship repair company, and the trial court denied a motion
to compel issuance of process. In affirming, the court of appeals held
that the ship repair company could be "found" within the Southern
District because (1) as a New York corporation, it was subject to
personal jurisdiction within the requirements of due process of law,
and (2) it was subject to process in admiralty by two of the various
methods allowed by Rules 4(c), (d), (e) or (f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Under Rule 4(f) a district court may issue process
anywhere within the territorial limits of the state, and under New York
law, which is made applicable by Rule 4(d) (7), a New York corpora-
tion can be served simply by serving the Secretary of State. Thus, the
court held that regardless of where in the state its principal office was
located, the New York corporation could be "found" within the
district by two methods of service.
The ruling in Chilean Line Inc. v. United States120 has not been
included in the body of Supplemental Rule B. As under the former
admiralty rule, no definition of "found within the district" has been
attempted. In all probability, the rule was formalized beyond recall
before the decision in Chilean Line Inc. could be considered. Neverthe-
less, it is clear from the remarks of the Advisory Committee which
drafted the Supplemental Rules that the Committee intended to reject
any restriction of the attachment remedy based on the grounds later
espoused in Chilean Line Inc. Specifically, it is clear from the Com-
mittee's remarks concerning Supplemental Rule B that by retaining,
on the one hand, the phrase "found within the district" and, on the
other hand, by omitting in the same context the right of statewide
118 Ibid.
119 344 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1965).
120 Ibid.
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service under rule 4(f), the Committee intended to "enlarge the class
of cases" in which the attachment remedy could be used and intended
to permit its use whenever a reasonable attempt to serve defendant
literally "within the district" would fail. The Advisory Committee's
note states:
A change in the context of the practice is brought about by Rule
4(f), which will enable summons to be served throughout the state
instead of, as heretofore, only within the district. The Advisory Com-
mittee considered whether the rule on attachment and garnishment
should be correspondingly changed to permit those remedies only
when the defendant cannot be found within the state and concluded
that the remedy should not be so limited.
The effect is to enlarge the class of cases in which the plaintiff may
proceed by attachment or garnishment although jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant may be independently obtained. This is
possible at the present time where, for example, a corporate defen-
dant has appointed an agent within the district to accept service of
process but is not carrying on activities there sufficient to subject it
to jurisdiction ... or where, though the foreign corporation's activ-
ities in the district are sufficient to subject it personally to the
jurisdiction, there is in the district no officer on whom process can
be served .... 121
This unified expression of intention by this committee of ex-
perienced admiralty attorneys, speaking as they did for all interests in
the maritime community, should have in the future a "highly persua-
sive'1 22 effect on construction of the phrase "found within the district."
Unfortunately, however, it appears that the court in Chilean Line
Inc. had before it an advance publication of the note of the Advisory
Committee quoted above, but nonetheless reached exactly the opposite
conclusion from that urged by the Committee. The court said:
the advisory committee . . . notes that while the doing business
test will continue to be applied on a case to case basis,... Rule 4(f)
will enable summons to be served on the defendant throughout the
state .... We think that we may well hold that 'found within the
district' ... should today be held to encompass the situation here.las
This holding, of course, restricted the scope of the attachment
remedy while the note of the Advisory Committee "concluded that the
remedy should not be so limited. The effect is to enlarge the class of
cases in which the plaintiff may proceed by attachment.' 24
121 39 F.D. 148 (1966).
122 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 1.13(2), (2d ed. 1965); Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Corp., 353 M.S. 222, 227-28 (1957).
123 344 F.2d at 761.
124 Supra note 114.
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If we have interpreted the remarks of the Advisory Committee
correctly, it would also appear to be a logical extension thereof that
just as the Committee did not intend to restrict the attachment remedy
by the possibility under Rule 4(f) of state-wide service outside "the
district," the Committee likewise did not intend to restrict the remedy
by the possibility under state law, as implemented by rule 4(d) (7), of
service outside "the district." The latter possibility was, of course, the
second method of service assigned in Chilean Line Inc. v. United
States125 as a reason for vacating the attachment; namely, the fact
that defendant as a domestic corporation could be served under rule
4(d) (7) in any manner permitted by New York law and under New
York law service on a domestic corporation could be made by service
on the Secretary of State. As service on the Secretary of State of New
York at Albany would be as much outside "the district" as service
at some place of business of defendant in New York state outside "the
district," neither method of service should, under this interpretation
of the intention of the Advisory Committee, be sufficient to defeat
attachment.
Related to the problem of service under state law outside "the
district" is the problem presented by the so-called state "long-arm"
statutes; specifically, in the maritime field, those laws referred to as
"non-resident watercraft statutes."
Typically, such a statute provides, in substance, that operation by
a non-resident of a watercraft upon the waters of the state constitutes
appointment of the Secretary of State to accept service of process on
behalf of the non-resident in any action against him "growing out of
any accident or collision in which said nonresident may be involved
... on the waters of the state .... 1 26
The validity of these statutes has been uniformly upheld.2 They
provide an effective remedy against a citizen non-resident, but appear
to have limited effectiveness when the non-resident watercraft owner
is an alien since judgment against him is not entitled to full faith and
credit in an alien court. Suppose that a maritime suit in personam,
with prayer for attachment is filed against an alien non-resident water-
craft owner on a cause of action arising out of the activity described by
such a statute. The question is then whether an attachment of the alien
125 344 F.2d at 761.
126 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1547.36 (Page 1953).
127 Valkenburg K.G. v. S.S. Henry Denny, 295, F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1961) (Illinois
Statute); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962)
(Virginia Statute); S.S. Philipine Jose Abad Santos v. Bannister, 335 F.2d 595 (Sth Cir.
1964) (Louisiana Statute); Leport v. White River Barge Line, 315 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.
1963) (Pennsylvania Statute); Ingravallo v. Pool Shipping Co., 247 F. Supp. 394
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (New York Statute).
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non-resident's property "within the district" may be vacated under
the state statute because of the availability of substituted service on
the Secretary of State outside "the district." Can the defendant thus "be
found within the district"? In light of the Advisory Committee's note,
the answer may be "no". But courts under the sway of Chilean Line
Inc v. United States2 ' might think otherwise and dissolve the attach-
ment. In doing so, however, they would be tendering to plaintiff, in
place of the powerful remedy of attachment, the relatively futile
remedy furnished by the absent watercraft-owner's statute; they would
be guilty of offering "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope."'"
3. Defenses of the Garnishee
In the event the goods or credits attached are not in fact the
property of the defendant, the garnishee or defendant should be able
to raise this defense at once by a motion to vacate the attachment. In
Galban Lobo Trading Co. v. The Diponegaro,30 the court appointed
a commissioner to determine ownership of the credit and the amount
thereof. In Cushing v. Laird,'31 the Supreme Court, after protracted
litigation, determined the ownership of funds derived from sale of a
Confederate vessel by a prize court.
When the attached goods or credits belong to defendant, the
garnishee is entitled to setoff therefrom a claim he may have against
defendant 32 even when the setoff is non-maritime.133
Plaintiff is entitled to file interrogatories to be answered by the
garnishee, and the garnishee must file answer thereto as well as an
answer to the complaint. If the garnishee admits a debt owing to the
defendant, the court may order it paid into the registry of the court.
Also, the garnishee may retain control of the debt subject to order of
the court, 34 or he may voluntarily pay the funds into court' 35
4. Retaliation by Counterclaim and a
Demand for Cross-Security
Continuing the former admiralty practice, Supplemental Rule
E(7) requires, unless the court otherwise directs, that when a defendant
128 Supra note 117.
129 Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516 (1949).
130 103 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
131 107 U.S. 69 (1882).
132 San Rafael Compania Naviera, SA. v. American Smelting & R. Co., 327 F.2d
581 (9th Cir. 1964).
133 Wilhelmsens DA.S. v. Canadian Venezuelan Ore. Co., 224 Fed. 881 (2d Cir. 1915).
134 Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. B(3) (a); Defense Plant Corp. v. United States Barge
Lines, 145 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1944).
135 Fed. R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. E(4) (c).
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who "has given security to respond in damages" files a counterclaim,
the plaintiff shall give security to respond in damages to the counter-
claim; until plaintiff does so, the original action shall be stayed.'36 The
normal effect of this rule is to assure to the defendant who has "given
security" and who has a proper maritime counterclaim against plain-
tiff'37 that he will have all the security for his counterclaim which an
actual seizure of plaintiff's property would have given him. In reality,
the rule bestows on defendant all the fruits of the in rem and attach-
ment remedies even in situations where neither remedy would be avail-
able to him. 38
This rule is highly advantageous to defendant in the most common
situation giving rise to a counterclaim-collision between ships. De-
pending on the trade routes of plaintiff's ship, seizure in rem may be
impossible within the jurisdiction where plaintiff has brought suit or,
in other cases, within any United States jurisdiction. Of course, when
plaintiff's ship is sunk in the collision, no seizure anywhere can be
made.19 Furthermore, the defendant who "has given security" is ac-
corded the same cross-security for his counterclaim which an attach-
ment of plaintiff's goods and credits would have given him despite the
fact that attachment is never available to him as a remedy within the
jurisdiction of plaintiff's suit. 40
The main source of controversy in this rule is the requirement that
before defendant may have cross-security on his counterclaim, he must
have "given security to respond in damages." Is it enough if defendant,
without the compulsion of seizure or threatened seizure of his property,
voluntarily posts security for plaintiff's claim as a pretext for obtaining
cross-security? The Supreme Court in Washington-Southern Co. v.
136 Although the rule does not say so, a demand for security should be made in the
counterclaim. 2 Benedict, Admiralty § 332 (6th ed. 1940).
137 The counterclaim must arise ".... out of the same transaction or occurrence with
respect to which the action was originally filed... ." Fed. R. Civ. Proc., Adm. Supp. E(7).
Iss Because of the statement in Spriggs v. Hoffstat, 240 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1957)
to the effect that there is a split of authority whether the cross-security rule applies where
the counterclaim is in personam rather than in rem the counterclaim should, whenever
possible, be lodged in rem.
139 A Government vessel is immune from seizure, but in The Gloria, 267 Fed. 929
(S.D.N.Y. 1919), defendant's motion for stay of the complaint until the Government
gave security on defendant's counterclaim was granted. Yet, in the court's discretion,
such a requirement may be waived. Charles Kurz & Co. v. South Carolina State Highway
Dep't, 242 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1957).
1.40 Plaintiff having made personal appearance by the filing of his complaint is
"found within the district." Seminole Lumber & Export Co. v. Bronx Barge Corp., 11
F.2d 982 (S.D. Fla. 1926).
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Baltimore Co.,141 held that such voluntary action by defendant does not
entitle him to security on his counterclaim.
Also, does the mere act of arrest or attachment of defendant's
property constitute the giving of security by defendant, or must
defendant actually post security for release of his property? Although
the problem was not directly presented to the Court in Washington
Southern Co. v. Baltimore Co.,'42 there are intimations both ways in
Justice Brandeis' opinion. The lower courts have likewise gone both
ways. In The Evangeline,43 the court held that the attachment of a
vessel by process in rem constitutes "giving of security" although no
release bond was given by defendant. The court in Pan American Ship-
ping Corp. v. Maritina'44 held to the contrary. There the complaint
was in rem for breach of time charter, with arrest of the vessel. No
stipulation for value or other security was given for release of the
vessel. Upon motion, after counterclaim was filed, the trial court
ordered plaintiff to give cross-security or to show cause why the vessel
should not be released and the original action stayed. The court of
appeals reversed on the ground that the admiralty rule required defen-
dant to post security and that arrest of the ship by plaintiff did not
constitute giving of security by defendant. The court also stated that
even if security had been given, the trial court's order was an abuse of
discretion because the admiralty rule merely authorized staying of the
action and did not authorize release of the vessel. 45
Nonetheless, the court has broad discretion under Supplemental
Rule E(7) which provides for cross-security "unless the court for
cause shown shall otherwise direct." The action need not be stayed for
refusal to post cross-security when plaintiff is impecunious or insol-
vent,'46 or where the counterclaim seeks damages which appear to be
speculative or are disproportionate to the amount sought by plaintiff. 47
141 263 U.S. 629 (1924).
142 Id. at 633, 638, 639.
143 36 F.2d 426 (SJJ N.Y. 1929); Cf. Lochmore S.S. Co. v. Hagar, 78 Fed. 642
(ED. Pa. 1897). See Partenreederel Wallschiff v. The Pioneer, 120 F. Supp. 525 (ED.
Mich. S. D. 1954), where the court offered to entertain a motion to require security from
defendant after defendant seized plaintiff's vessel under a counterclaim in rem.
144 193 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1952); Owego, 289 Fed. 263 (W.D. Wash. ND). 1923);
City of Beaumont, 8 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1925).
145 Contra, Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba v. M/V Ciudad, 245 F. Supp. 209
(D. Md. 1965).
146 City of Beaumont, 8 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1925); Geotas Compania De Vapores,
SA. v. S.S. Arie H., 237 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Seaboard & Caribbean Transport
v. Hafen-Dampfschiffahrt, 329 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1964).
147 Spriggs v. Hoffstat, 240 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1957).
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5. Damages for Wrongful Arrest or Attachment
Although the principle has often been stated by admiralty courts
that damages will be awarded for wrongful seizure of property when
the seizure is due to bad faith or gross negligence, there are few cases
in which an award of damages has actually been allowed. 48 This is
probably explained by the bad start made by the English judge who
first considered the problem and established the precedent that even
a clear maritime trespass with fatal results will not support a claim for
detention damages. 49
With such a precedent, it is not surprising that the right to
damages under less serious conditions was slow to emerge. However, in
Gow v. William W. Brauer S.S. Co.,150 the court awarded 25 hours
charter hire to a shipowner for the time his vessel was detained by the
charterer's wrongful seizure because the account between them showed
"according to any possible computation" that the charterer was, con-
trary to his sworn allegations, actually in debt to the shipowner. The
court said:
While the ordinary arrest of a vessel in a cause of damage, security
for costs having been given by the libelant, is an inconvenience to
which the owner is required to submit without a remedy, upon his
success in the action, beyond the costs, yet where the libelant pro-
ceeds without an honest belief that he is using a rightful remedy,
and his action is in the nature of a malicious prosecution, he should
be held in any damages suffered by the shipowner through his wrong-
ful act.' 5 '
Wrongful seizure induced by gross negligence is also actionable. In
Antinano v. W. R. Grace & Co.,152 damages for loss of a charter party
arising from wrongful seizure were held recoverable where the vessel
attached, instead of being a French wooden vessel 250 feet in length
named Consuelo (the real culprit), was actually a Spanish steel
steamship 350 feet in length named Consuelo. The court agreed that
advice of counsel and the existence of an actual controversy were
often sufficient to excuse a mistaken seizure, but found that this
seizure was too careless. 15
148 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 54.77[2J (2d ed. 1965).
149 The English case is discussed in The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1
(1826). Detention damages were sought for the wrongful seizure of a vessel as prize. The
seizure was made "after a sharp engagement" in which several seamen on each ship were
killed. Damages were denied.
150 113 Fed. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1902).
151 Id. at 674.
152 286 Fed. 702 (E.D. Va. 1923).
153 Those who deal in maritme commerce are charged with . the knowledge as to
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Even where the only mistake which induced the seizure appears to
be a mistake in law, plaintiff has been threatened with an eventual
award against him for damages, expenses and attorneys' fees.' 54 Yet,
extreme bad faith has resulted in no more than dissolution of the
seizure and imposition of court costs. 5
F. Basic Priorities in the Fund Created by Arrest or Attachment
We start with the assumption that as a result of the voluntary
release of funds by a garnishee or by satisfaction of judgment by claim-
ant or his sureties, or by judicial sale, 5 6 there exists a sum of money 7
in the registry of the court traceable to an original seizure or seizures of
property. Some understanding of the ranking of maritime liens is nec-
essary in order to avoid futile pursuit of a remedy. 58 In some situations
there can be no conffict of priorities between "liens" of attachment and
maritime liens because the property attached is not by nature subject
to a maritime Hen at all. Maritime liens can only attach to maritime
property or its substitute, while an attachment "lien" can be applied to
all goods and credits of defendant and can, therefore, be applied to
the ownership and operation of a named ship which accepted maritime publications, as
Lloyds Registry of Shipping would disclose." Valkenburg, K.G. v. S.S. Henry Denny,
295 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1961).
164 Hohenstein Shipping Co. v. Feliz Compania Naviera SA., 236 F. Supp. 216
(E.D.N.Y. 1964).
lG5 Former Rule 21 of the Southern District of New York provided that attachment
may be vacated on a showing of "any improper practice or a manifest want of equity on
part of libelant." See Maryland Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Pacific Ruler Co., 201
F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Skibs A/S Abaco, A., A. & N. v. Ardenshir B. Cursetjee
& Sons, 133 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Shewan v. Hallenbeck, 150 Fed. 231 (S.D.N.Y.
1906), where plaintiff waited until a day when defendant was out of the district to
bring suit and to make attachment.
156 Not considered are the mechanics of judicial sale which is provided for in Fed.
R. Civ. P., Adm. Supp. E(9). The procedural steps of sale are described by statute in the
case of forfeiture (e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1612; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465) and by local
court rules in the case of interlocutory sale and under final decree. See 2 Benedict,
Admiralty §§ 306-308 (6th ed. 1940); 3 Benedict, Admiralty §§ 447-449 (6th ed. 1940).
Sale of a ship which is still loaded with cargo presents bidding difficulties. Morrisey v.
S.S. A & J Faith, 238 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1964). It is suggested by The St.
Paul, 271 Fed. 265 (2d Cir. 1912) that cargo must bear the cost of discharging.
157 The fund available for distribution is first diminished by the charge for the
marshal's costs, fees and expenses during custody. 28 U.S.C. § 1921. These may include
such post-seizure expenses as wages of master or crew. In re Scott, 99 Fed. 404 (E.D.N.C.
1900); or wharfage, The St. Paul, 271 Fed. 265 (2d Cir. 1921); 3 Benedict, Admiralty
§ 449 (6th ed. 1940).
158 The barest outline of this complex and unsettled subject appears at 1 Benedict,
Admiralty § 11, 19 (6th ed. 1940). See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty 592-
624 (1957).
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non-maritime as well as to maritime property. Thus, when defendant's
bank account is attached by process in personam, plaintiff's claim will
not, except in unusual circumstances, 159 run into competition from
maritime liens. Suppose, however, there are multiple attachments of the
bank account in personam, and the fund is not large enough to satisfy
all. In such a case the attachment which is made first in time has
priority over later attachments. 60
However, when maritime property-ship, freights, cargo--is
attached by process in personam, plaintiff may be opposed by mari-
time lienors who will assert their liens by intervention in the attach-
ment.'' As against maritime lien holders, plaintiff's prior attachment
has no effect' 62 except that he stands last in line for payment. This is
because the lien of attachment is not the same as a maritime lien; the
latter is secret "with qualities of paramountcy," while the lien of
attachment possesses no "quality of paramountcy.' 63 Indeed, in Jack-
son v. Inland Oil & Transport Co., 64 the attachment lien is referred
to as a "quasi-lien" and was, in this case, not only subordinated to a
maritime lien for repairs, but was also subordinated to a non-maritime
purchase money mortgage which did not even comply with state law."6 5
CONCLUSION
Where the identity of the responsible party is unknown to the
party wronged, or where the responsible party is known to reside over-
seas, the maritime remedies of arrest in rem or attachment in personam
are indispensable means of redress in United States courts. Where the
responsible party is personally accountable in some United States juris-
diction, these maritime remedies give the party wronged a wider
choice of forum and greater security for his claim than under the
common law. By the same token, there are defenses and counter-
measures available to the defendant whose property is seized in ad-
159 E.g., if the bank account represented proceeds traceable to sale of a tortfeasor
vessel.
160 San Rafael Compania Naviera SA. v. American Smelting & R. Co., 327 F.2d
581 (9th Cir. 1964). The case, however, raises the problem of how the debt could have
a situs in two places; Esso Standard (Switzerland) v. The Arosa Sun, 184 F. Supp. 124
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
161 Kahn v. Niagara Laundry & Linen Supply Co., 10 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1926).
162 San Rafael Compania Naviera SA. v. American Smelting & R. Co., supra note
159. The case presents arrests and attachments of the same fund in two jurisdictions.
163 Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1941).
164 318 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1963).
165 Ibid. Although the mortgage was not recorded in the manner required by state
law, it was recorded with U.S. Customs as permitted by 46 U.S.C. § 921.
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miralty which tend to equalize the situation and which would not be
available at common law.
Even where these maritime remedies bring to bear the maximum
pressure upon defendant they are less severe in their consequences
than one of their ancestors, the formidable suit by "summons and dis-
tress infinite" described in Manro v. Almeida.'166 We have come far.
Effective July 1, 1966, the remedy of "distress infinite" against the per-
son was abolished in admiralty.16 7 The remedies of arrest and attach-
ment of property still remain, but the distress is not infinite.
1 6 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 485, 489 (1825).
167 Former Supreme Court Admiralty Rule 2 concerning suits in personam authorized
that process "may be by a simple warrant of arrest of the person." This provision has been
dropped from the Supplemental Rules. See Note of Advisory Committee, 39 F.RD. 147
(1966).
